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8. Corporate agency, character, purpose
and the common good
Geoff Moore
8.1 INTRODUCTION
I begin this chapter with discussions, in Sections 8.2 and 8.3, about two
related concepts – agency and character – which are familiar to us at the
individual level, but which I shall argue can be appropriately and usefully
applied at the organizational, or corporate, level. This leads, in Section
8.4, to a discussion about the purpose of the firm. I begin that section
with what may seem to be a rather technical discussion by way of
clarification of and, to some extent, disagreement with a position taken
by Sison and Fontrodona (2012) concerning the purpose or, in their
terms, the common good, of the firm. This will introduce a MacIntyrean
perspective (and, so I shall argue, corrective) to an Aristotelian–
Thomistic position as incorporated into Catholic Social Teaching (CST).
The importance of this seemingly pedantic correction will, I hope,
become clear. Taken together, these three components – agency, charac-
ter, purpose – give a rounded account of the characteristics and role of
the firm and hence of its potential to contribute to the common good.
8.2 CORPORATE AGENCY
That individuals, under normal circumstances, are moral agents, with all
that that implies for the allocation of responsibility, praise, blame and
punishment, is not in question, although I shall return below to the ability
of individuals to exercise that agency inside organizations. However,
whether collectives of individuals, such as corporations, can be regarded
as moral agents is much more open to question. Despite significant
attention in the scholarly literature, this remains a contested area – see,
for example, Dubbink and Smith (2011), French (1995), Hess (2013) and
Moore (1999), who argue for corporate moral agency; and Hasnas
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(2012), Ronnegard (2013) and Velasquez (2003), who argue against it.
There is no space here, nor will it serve my purpose, to summarize this
extensive literature. However, despite my previous support for corporate
moral agency, I am now with those who argue that we cannot attribute
moral agency to collectives. The position I now hold is known tech-
nically as methodological individualism – only individuals, and not
aggregations, including organizations, are fully fledged moral agents.
But that is not the end of the matter. We should note that Velasquez
(2003) makes a helpful distinction between moral, causal and compens-
atory responsibility, arguing that, while corporations cannot be morally
responsible, they can be causally responsible for their actions, and hence
that they may have responsibility to compensate those who are harmed
by such actions. That is to say, whether we can identify individual
members of a corporation who were responsible for a particular action or
not (and, if we can, there is nothing in this literature, on either side of the
debate, that suggests such individuals should be able to hide behind the
‘corporate veil’ and so evade their moral responsibilities and not be
blamed and punished), it is the case that we can meaningfully say ‘the
corporation caused this to occur’. We can say such things of a corpor-
ation, just as we can say that the wind caused the tree to fall and damage
the house. That is, while there is no intentionality and hence no fault
intended, and thus no moral responsibility can be attributed, none the less
we cannot say ‘that organizations never exert causal influences on their
members’ (Velasquez, 2003, p. 543), although when they do exert these
influences, they do so ‘through the interior desires and beliefs about the
organization that these members have in their individual minds’ (ibid.,
p. 544). In other words, we can legitimately attribute intentional cor-
porate causal agency in the sense that ‘the corporate organization can be
the intentional object of thoughts, perceptions, or desires that cause
response or events in [its members]’ (ibid., p. 557).
Hasnas (2012, p. 194), while also arguing against corporate moral
responsibility, makes a further helpful point in this regard:
The language of corporate moral responsibility can serve an important
expressive function. By allowing us to speak as though moral agency can be
predicated on indefinite collections of loosely related and constantly changing
individuals, it facilitates people’s efforts to express moral condemnation of
both the behavior of corporate employees and a corporation’s ethical culture.
Such language is much more efficient at mobilizing public sentiment than are
the cumbersome statements required to identify the interactions among an
amorphous group of people that produce morally unacceptable results. One
might say that the language of corporate moral responsibility reduces com-
municative transaction costs.
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Taken in combination, this then allows us to speak meaningfully of
corporations as having responsibility because they exert causal influences
on their members. And while this may be in such a way that it seems as
though they possess corporate moral agency, this is actually corporate
responsibility in a restricted, causal sense.
Arriving at such a conclusion about corporate agency may be all well
and good. However, there is one further issue that we need to address.
While corporations possess agency in the restricted way described above,
having the ability to exercise it is another issue. At the individual level,
and in relation to managers in bureaucratic organizations, this was
MacIntyre’s concern:
[I]n his capacity of corporate executive, the manager not only has no need to
take account of, but must not take account of certain types of considerations
which he might feel obliged to recognize were he acting as parent, as
consumer, or as citizen. (MacIntyre, 1979, p. 126, emphasis in original)
In other words, according to MacIntyre, the manager’s agency is so
constrained by the corporate environment that s/he is not a ‘free’ agent.
Institutional theory has addressed this issue, at least at the practical level,
and has introduced the notion of the paradox of embedded agency
(Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009). On this understanding, individual agency
is embedded within the institutional environment (both organizational
and at ‘higher’ levels such as the organizational field). And there is the
possibility that such an environment is so ‘totalizing’ that there is no
room for agency to be exercised at all. The Holocaust’s impact on Jews is
usually taken to be the archetypical case, although even here it is
instructive to read stories such as that of Etty Hillesum (see, for example,
Hillesum and Hoffman, 1996), which provide evidence that even under
these most severe of circumstances, it may still be possible to exercise
agency.
Thus, that individuals in the corporate setting still have the opportunity
to exercise their agency, and the mechanisms by which that operates, is
also found in the literature (see, for example, Fernando and Moore,
2015). Agency can, in other words, become sufficiently dis-embedded,
thereby allowing an actor ‘the ability to make choices independently of
existing social structures’ (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009, p. 46). As I
have argued elsewhere,
[i]n MacIntyrean terms this would mean organizational practitioners who …
are able through the exercise of virtue to appropriately dis-embed themselves,
at least to some extent, from such constraints, so as to create a more
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conducive environment and organizational culture through which the organ-
ization could flourish. (Fernando and Moore, 2015, p. 189)
That it is possible to apply the same notions of embedded and dis-
embedded agency at the organizational level is also supported empirically
in this literature (see Fernando and Moore, 2015; Walker et al., 2014).1
Hence this can be applied not only to individuals but also to organ-
izations that not only possess agency in the way described above, but also
have the ability to exercise that agency, even within certain institutional
constraints. And the virtuous organization (to which we turn next), just as
the virtuous individual, would tend to exercise that agency in such a way
as to lead to the common good of the organization, and hence potentially
to the common good of society.
8.3 CORPORATE CHARACTER
I hope to have demonstrated that we have an intelligible concept of
corporate agency. From this as a base, we can move on to consider the
notion of corporate character. If a corporation has agency, then it follows
that we may be able to speak appropriately and usefully of a corpor-
ation’s character, in much the same way as we can talk of corporate
agency and, indeed, culture. Before I discuss this in detail, however, I
should first identify a number of areas where I agree with Sison and
Fontrodona (2012), given that I shall be disagreeing with them in the
following section. They identify firms2 as intermediate bodies, ‘situated
between individuals and families, on the one hand, and the political
community, on the other’ (ibid., p. 212), and characterize them as
artificial and imperfect societies – artificial because the firm ‘does not
arise directly from human nature in the same necessary way that families
or political communities do’, and imperfect because, as societies, ‘they
are not self-sufficing; instead they depend on families and the polity’
(ibid., p. 221). From there, they agree with me about notions of the
virtuous corporation and, hence, of corporate character (ibid., pp. 229–
30). And they go on to say that ‘personal virtues facilitate institutional or
corporate virtues in the same way that institutional or corporate virtues
facilitate personal virtues’ (ibid., p. 230).
But you may have noticed that there is an elision here from an
accepted understanding of virtues (and vices), and hence of character as a
summary and shorthand for the virtues and vices an individual possesses,
to their application at the corporate level, without much by way of
consideration of whether such a move is justified. Can we talk sensibly
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about corporate-level virtues, vices and character, and, if so, what
precisely do we mean by that, and what practical effect might it have?
In a similar vein to the contested nature of corporate (moral) agency
that I discussed above, there has been a debate over the application of
notions such as virtue and character to the corporate form. One approach
has been to argue not for an ontological position (in effect that, as in the
‘for’ camp above, corporations are in themselves moral agents), but a
metaphorical one (see Chun, 2005, p. 277; Klein, 1988, p. 56; Moore,
2005, p. 664 and note 4; Moore and Beadle, 2006, p. 374; Whetstone,
2005, p. 371). In this approach it is considered both appropriate and
helpful to talk by way of metaphor in terms of corporate-level virtues and
hence of the aggregated notion of corporate character. On this basis
corporations can be described, by way of projection from the personal to
the corporate, in a manner that is similar to the way in which we speak of
individuals.
However, I now judge this approach to be problematic in so far as it
suggests that terms like ‘courageous’, ‘just’, ‘temperate’ and ‘wise’,
when applied to corporations, do not have any literal meaning – only that
the corporation has characteristics that are ‘like’ this or that virtue. It is as
if the corporation were like this – but (so the metaphorical approach says)
we all know that, in reality, they are not like this. Nor would such
characteristics, as metaphors, have any causal power, whereas, in line
with the agency position derived above, the classical characterization of
the virtues (as Aristotle and Aquinas, for example, understood them) was
that they are habits that cause morally laudable behaviours.
The positive organizational psychology literature, while not resolving
the philosophical debate around agency, adopts this causal approach.
Cameron et al. (2004, p. 768, emphasis in original), for example, speak
of ‘virtuousness in organizations’, referring to the behaviour of the
organization’s members, and ‘virtuousness enabled by organizations’,
referring to ‘the features of the organization that engender virtuousness
on the part of members’. For our purposes it is the use of the term
virtuousness as ‘features of the organization’ that is relevant and suggests
neither an ontological nor a metaphorical position, but none the less one
in which causal power is evident.
A helpful development of this approach may be found in Palanski et al.
(2011). Here, the notion of virtues at the meso level of the team is
developed and validated empirically. They begin with an assumption that
‘virtues are fundamentally isomorphic – that is, they have the same basic
structure and function across levels of analysis’ (ibid., p. 202). Their
study uses constructs that include transparency, behavioural integrity,
trust and performance, and they argue that these are properties not only
154 The challenges of capitalism for virtue ethics and the common good
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of the individuals who comprise the team, but also of the teams
themselves. Given that teams are aggregates of individuals, and given
their empirical validation of these constructs at the team level, they
establish the notion of team-level virtues. But with this conceptual move,
it is then consistent to extend this to the organizational level – a further
move that is only a quantitatively higher level of aggregation, not, I
would argue, a qualitatively different one.
This approach therefore suggests a synergistic hypothesis, that an
organization ‘is not merely a passive container that holds the virtues of
its members, but rather it provides a more generative (or perhaps
deleterious) context in which organizational members interact in ways
that prompt, enable and/or enhance (or perhaps diminish or inhibit)
virtue’ (Bright et al., 2014, p. 456).3
If this position is accepted, we can refer to organizational-level virtues
as properties or (as above) features of the organization that have causal
effect. On this basis we could ascribe particular virtues and vices to a
business organization, summarize the aggregation of those virtues and
vices by means of a description of character, and exercise judgement over
such a description of character in overall terms – describing a corporation
as virtuous or vicious or, more likely, as having a character that lies
somewhere between these extremes, virtuous in some respects and not in
others.4 In effect, as will be appreciated, this is an extension of the
agency argument discussed above.
Derivative of this approach, corporate character has been defined as
the summary of characteristics that develop over time in response to a
corporation’s challenges, opportunities and its own pursuit of virtue. A
corporation can be characterised by the extent to which it possesses and
exercises moral virtues (and lacks the associated vices) and by the extent to
which it draws on the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom in its pursuit of
a good purpose and to enable the correct ordering in its pursuit of both
excellence and success. (Moore, 2015, p. 109)
This definition has been developed by incorporating MacIntyrean con-
cepts, in which excellence is a shorthand for the internal goods of the
practice and success for the external goods of the institution (see further
below and Table 8.1 for a summary). While it refers only to one specific
virtue (practical wisdom), the paper from which it is drawn provides a
full, philosophically grounded taxonomy of corporate virtues. But what
this definition does provide is a means of talking sensibly about the
character of individual firms, and with causal effect on the actions of
individuals within the firm. As such, it serves a purpose in relation to
business ethics, which is usually served by the notion of corporate culture
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Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Akrivou-Challenges_of_capitalism / Division: 08Chapter8 /Pg. Position: 6 / Date: 12/5
Kleio Akrivou and Alejo José G Sison - 9781784717902
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/24/2017 09:01:22AM
via University of Durham
JOBNAME: Akrivou PAGE: 7 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Thu Jul 14 14:25:14 2016
in the organizational literature and in practice – something I have
addressed in an earlier paper (see Moore, 2005).
The implications of this are that we have a robust notion of a firm
possessing character, and hence potentially promoting virtuous behaviour
in its members, in such a way as to contribute to the common good.
Indeed, corporate character may be the major determinant of whether a
firm does contribute to the common good or not – as with individuals, a
character that is deficient in one or more respects is unlikely to be good
for the firm, or for the community within which it is set. But this leads us
to consider in more detail what the common good consists of, and how
the firm may contribute to it.
8.4 CORPORATE PURPOSE AND A MACINTYREAN
CRITIQUE OF THE COMMON GOOD OF THE
FIRM
The phrase ‘the common good’ is an often-used shorthand that obviously
expresses something more than the good of any one individual. Yet, as
Sison and Fontrodona (2012, p. 211) note, its specific meaning is often
opaque and it is unclear whether, if applied seriously, it would lead to
determinate courses of action. By drawing on Aristotelian and Thomistic
notions and combining these with CST,5 Sison and Fontrodona develop a
composite description (though, frustratingly, never a definition) of the
common good. Returning to one source from which they draw, the
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Pontifical Council for
Justice and Peace, 2004, henceforth CSDC) within CST states:
A society that wishes and intends to remain at the service of the human being
at every level is a society that has the common good – the good of all people
and of the whole person – as its primary goal. The human person cannot find
fulfilment in himself [sic], that is, apart from the fact that he exists ‘with’
others and ‘for’ others. (Ibid., 165, emphasis in original)6
And further:
The common good does not consist in the simple sum of the particular goods
of each subject of a social entity. Belonging to everyone and to each person,
it is and remains ‘common’, because it is indivisible and because only
together is it possible to attain it, increase it and safeguard its effectiveness,
with regard also to the future. (Ibid., 164, emphasis in original)
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Sison and Fontrodona (2012, p. 215) expand this description from CST
by noting that both Aristotle and Aquinas understand the common good
to indicate ‘a common end or perfection … of human beings’ usually
taken to be eudaimonia, which MacIntyre (2007, p. 148) defines as
‘blessedness, happiness, prosperity. It is the state of being well and doing
well, of a man’s being well-favoured himself and in relation to the
divine’.7 Sison and Fontrodona (2012, p. 217) also note that ‘the common
good is contingent with time and place, it cannot be determined once and
for all. Thus, we are constantly required to engage in dialogue, deliber-
ation and joint action’.
Having described the common good as outlined above, Sison and
Fontrodona then apply this general and social idea to the firm. They
define the common good of the firm as ‘the production of goods and
services in which human beings participate through work’ (ibid., p. 225).
Later, an important clarification is offered: ‘the goods and services
produced should be truly useful and satisfy the legitimate needs and
wants of people’ (ibid., p. 233). The common good, clearly, cannot be
served through goods and services that do not meet this condition,
although this does leave open who determines what is ‘legitimate’. We
can, perhaps, assume that this is via the ‘dialogue, deliberation and joint
action’ noted above, so that legitimacy is socially constructed and
therefore contingent. So far, so good.
However, a distinction is then drawn from this definition of the
common good of the firm between the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’
dimensions of productive work. Subjective dimensions are ‘such as
knowledge or skills acquired, habits and virtues developed, meaning’, or,
again, ‘technical or artistic skills and intellectual and moral virtues’
(ibid., p. 212). Objective dimensions are ‘such as the goods and services
in themselves, or profits earned’ (ibid.). Sison and Fontrodona are here
drawing explicitly on CST and the Pontifical Council for Justice and
Peace document cited above. There it states:
Human work has a twofold significance: objective and subjective. In the
objective sense, it is the sum of activities, resources, instruments and
technologies used by men and women to produce things … In the subjective
sense, work is the activity of the human person as a dynamic being capable of
performing a variety of actions that are part of the work process and that
correspond to his [sic] personal vocation: Man … is a person, that is to say, a
subjective being capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of
deciding about himself, and with a tendency to self-realization. As a person,
man is therefore the subject of work. (CSDC, 270, emphasis in original)
Work in the objective sense constitutes the contingent aspect of human
activity, which constantly varies in its expressions according to the changing
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technological, cultural, social and political conditions. Work in the subjective
sense, however, represents its stable dimension, since it does not depend on
what people produce or on the type of activity they undertake, but only and
exclusively on their dignity as human beings. (Ibid., emphasis in original)
On a careful reading of these original statements, exactly where the
product is made or the service provided seems to be somewhat opaque –
is it within the objective dimension, or the subjective dimension, a
combination of the two, or somewhere in between? However, on balance,
it seems that we should agree with Sison and Fontrodona’s precise
location of it within the objective dimension.8
Taking this as a basis, Sison and Fontrodona (2012, pp. 228–9) then
make a comparison with MacIntyre’s distinction between internal and
external goods and my own use of them in relation to (business)
organizations. There it is claimed that there is, in effect, a direct
one-to-one correlation between internal goods and the subjective dimen-
sion of human work, on the one hand, and between external goods and
the objective dimension on the other. However, this is not correct, and
while it might seem like a minor technical quibble between academics
that has no practical effect, it leads to a fundamental point that, I think,
has potentially quite significant practical implications.9
MacIntyre is quite clear that internal goods include both the perfection
of the individual and the excellence of products or services (MacIntyre,
1994, p. 284; 2007, pp. 189–90). Thus, in this respect, he combines what
Sison and Fontrodona identify as the subjective and objective dimen-
sions. External goods, however, are ‘such goods as prestige, status and
money’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 188), or, in a business context, ‘include
survival, reputation, power, profit or, more generally success’ (Moore,
2012a, p. 365). Internal goods are associated with what MacIntyre terms
practices, while external goods are associated with what he terms
institutions – a distinction that has led to the defining of organizations as,
in MacIntyrean terms, practice–institution combinations (Moore and
Beadle, 2006). Table 8.1 provides definitions of these terms as well as of
organizational purpose that we shall come to below.
Now, why does all this matter? It matters because the next move that
Sison and Fontrodona make, already implicit in the CSDC quotations
above, is to distinguish between the relative priority of the subjective
and objective dimensions. And it becomes clear that the subjective is
more important than the objective: ‘the common good of the firm is
the work in common that allows human beings not only to produce goods
and services (the objective dimension), but more importantly, to develop
technical or artistic skills and intellectual and moral virtues (the
158 The challenges of capitalism for virtue ethics and the common good
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Table 8.1 MacIntyrean concepts and definition
Practice
‘Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of
the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.’(MacIntyre,
2007, p. 187)
Internal goods
The excellence of the products or services and the perfection of the
practitioners in the process.10 (MacIntyre, 1994, p. 284; 2007, pp. 189–90)
Institutions
‘Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with what I
have called external goods. They are involved in acquiring money and other
material goods; they are structured in terms of power and status, and they
distribute money, power and status as rewards. Nor could they do otherwise
if they are to sustain not only themselves, but also the practices of which
they are the bearers.’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 194)
External goods
Power, fame, money, success. ‘It is characteristic of what I have called
external goods that when achieved they are always some individual’s
property and possession [and are therefore] characteristically objects of
competition in which there must be losers as well as winners.’ (MacIntyre,
2007, p. 190)
Organizational purpose
‘The extent to which the internal goods of the practice at the core of the
organization (the excellence of the product or service and the “perfection”
of the practitioners in the process) contribute to the overriding good of the
community.’ (Moore, 2012a, p. 366)
subjective dimension)’ (Sison and Fontrodona, 2012, p. 230, emphasis
added; see again Note 8). Or again:
We have defined the common good of the firm as the participatory work in
which all its different members engage, insofar as this provides them firstly,
with an opportunity to acquire and develop skills, virtues and meaning
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(subjective dimension), and secondly, with a chance to efficiently or profit-
ably produce goods and services that society needs (objective dimension).
(Ibid., p. 240, emphasis added)
They expand further on this point by stating that ‘[w]ork in common then
becomes the reason for being of the firm, [which] brings together all the
people and resources involved in the production process; it [work in
common] is the end that they all share in common’ (ibid., emphasis
added). Or again:
The common good of the firm does not relate, at first hand, to the goods and
services produced in themselves. It does not lie primarily in things, but in
their production by a group. Work in common, then, is the reason people come
together to form the firm. Certainly, their activity does not take place in a void
and a whole lot of material resources are needed. But people share more
directly in the work itself than in the products that come from this work.
(Ibid., p. 227, emphasis added)
Now while this comprises a very high view of work, and thence to CST’s
principled commitment to full employment, it also leads to a prioritiz-
ation of work over the product that results or the service that is provided,
which MacIntyre will not allow. It also leads to what I regard as a
problematic identification of the virtues with the subjective dimension;
virtue is identified ‘in general with the subjective, non-material dimen-
sion of the common good of the firm’ (Sison and Fontrodona, 2012,
p. 212). But, from a MacIntyrean perspective, virtue can be exercised just
as much in the production of goods and services, and even in the making
and sustaining of institutions with their focus on external goods (see
Moore, 2008, for example).
In my own work, I have tended to refer to the good purpose of the
firm, rather than to the common good, and define the good purpose of the
firm in MacIntyrean terms as ‘the extent to which the internal goods of
the practice at the core of the organization (the excellence of the product
or service and the “perfection” of the practitioners in the process)
contribute to the overriding good of the community’ (Moore, 2012a,
p. 366). While the latter part of this definition fits well with CST’s high
view of work and the flourishing of individual practitioners, combining
this with the product or service, such that both are internal goods, leads
to a focus on the good purpose of the firm that asks as much (if not
more) about its products or services as it does about the effect of their
productive work on the practitioners. And this, it seems to me, is an
essential correction to Sison and Fontrodona’s work and potentially to
CST more generally.
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To see why, take the relatively simple example of the Apple iPhone. To
the customer, which is more important – the quality of the product or the
moral ‘perfecting’ of the individuals who made it? While we would, quite
rightly, be concerned that no one in the process of producing the phone
was exploited, including a proper concern for workers in the whole
supply chain,11 I suspect that not only are we in no position to judge the
‘perfecting’ or otherwise of those individuals, but that we are not overly
concerned about it. Now this may well be wrong, and the Aristotelian–
Thomistic/CST tradition may well act as a necessary corrective here, and
would then take us not only into concerns about full employment but also
about the provision of meaningful work (Beadle and Knight, 2012;
Yeoman, 2014). But to prioritize the ‘perfecting’ of the individuals over
the product or service seems equally mistaken.
This is exemplified in a later article, in which Sison and Fontrodona
(2013, p. 613, emphasis added) state:
The common good of the university institution … is not the lectures or the
research alone or in themselves, but the tightly woven web of collaborative
work, from cleaning and catering through purchasing and accounting and so
forth, that together allow for the lectures and the research (the acquisition and
transmission of knowledge) to take place.
But the purpose of a university, its contribution to the common good, is,
uncontroversially, I think, the research it conducts and the education it
provides, just as the purpose of a school is the education and general
development of its pupils. That the professors, lecturers and teachers,
together with all those who support them, might well be ‘perfected’ in the
process – and, indeed, that this might be a necessary condition for the
school to achieve its good purpose – is also a desirable outcome. But it
surely cannot be accorded priority over the good of the production of
knowledge and the good of the students and pupils. The same argument
could be made about hospitals, where the good of patients must be
accorded priority over the good of the doctors, nurses and administrators
who work there, with the same caveat that this may be achievable only if
the practitioners are ‘perfected’ in the process. And similarly with firms,
with their economic function, as already identified in the Apple iPhone
example. In all these cases, the common good is surely served as much,
if not more, by the products or services provided as by the ‘perfection’ of
the practitioners.
This is to say (and to repeat) that the good purpose of the firm is the
provision of the internal goods of the practice, both the excellence of its
products or services and the ‘perfection’ of the practitioners in the
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process, in such a way and to the extent that these contribute to the
common good. And, as noted above, since the common good is socially
constructed and contingent, and so cannot be determined once and for all,
there is a need to constantly engage in dialogue and deliberation over
what the common good is and how the internal goods of the firm
contribute to it. As MacIntyre (2010) puts it, ‘[i]n contemporary societies
our common goods can only be determined in concrete and particular
terms through widespread, grassroots, shared, rational deliberation’.
8.5 CONCLUSION
It is sometimes argued that business organizations are the most signifi-
cant actors in society, with the resources and abilities necessary to solve
social problems. While not seeking to judge between the contributions to
the common good of various organizations in different sectors, it is surely
the case that business organizations have a significant role to play here.
In line with this, I have offered a nuanced account of agency, and of its
practical operation at the corporate level. That corporations possess such
agency, in the restricted sense outlined above, and can exercise it, means
that they are capable of playing such a role. I have explored and sought
to justify the notion of corporate character, suggesting that possessing a
good character is of singular importance if the potential for the good
purpose of the firm is to be realized. I have then suggested a MacIntyrean
correction to the Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition as incorporated into
CST concerning the purpose of the firm, so that this gives as much
weight to the goods produced or services provided as to the intrinsic
value of the work undertaken. It is in the good purpose of the firm
through the contribution of these internal goods, both the products or
services and the ‘perfection’ of practitioners, that the common good of
the firm subsists. And this holds out the possibility that the common good
of the firm may indeed contribute to the realization of the general
common good.
In sum, then, and despite MacIntyre’s own doubts in this regard, this
chapter gives a rounded account of the characteristics and role of the firm
and hence of its potential to contribute to the common good.
NOTES
1. Fernando and Moore (2015) argue this explicitly, although with the caveat that this
operates through individual actors, in the same way that Velasquez (2003) argues. In
Walker et al.’s (2014) case, this is more implicit, although they talk of ‘organizational
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ingenuity’ in much the same way as we speak of organizational culture and of its causal
impact on organizational members.
2. I use Sison and Fontrodona’s term ‘firms’ here. This is not meant to imply any difference
between corporations and firms, nor indeed between firms and other productive organ-
izations. Everything that I argue in this chapter can be taken as applying to productive
organizations in general, even though the focus is on business organizations, and the
different terms can be taken as synonymous.
3. Bright et al. (2014) identify the ‘container’ and ‘intrinsic’ hypotheses as alternatives to the
‘synergy’ hypothesis discussed here. The container hypothesis ‘sees organizational virtue
as an aggregation of individual virtue’ (p. 455) such that if an organization is virtuous it is
simply the result of its containing virtuous members. The intrinsic hypothesis treats the
organization ‘as a unified organism with its own deliberative systems, structures, pro-
cesses, and culture such that the organization itself has virtues’ (p. 456). This is equivalent
to a fully fledged moral agency position, which I have refuted above.
4. See Moore (2012a; 2012b) for a fuller exploration of the notion of the virtuous
corporation.
5. It is worth noting the difference between Catholic Social Teaching, the official statements
of the Church, and Catholic social thought, which is a term used to refer to the informal
reflections by Catholic theologians, ethicists and philosophers beyond the Church’s official
teaching documents.
6. References to this document are to the paragraph, not page, number.
7. Eudaimonia, according to Sison and Fontrodona (2012, p. 215), is intrinsic, social and
practical: ‘“intrinsic” because it does not exist apart from the political community, “social”
because the polity is a mere unity of order, not of being, and “practical” because it is an
object of production, not of contemplation’. They are here contrasting the human
conception of the common good with Aquinas’s notion of God as an extrinsic, ontological
and speculative common good.
8. It may be that the status of the distinction here is either metaphysical or practical, but this
is unclear and hence problematic. If it is just about the significance of one over the other
(a practical distinction), then a balance may be struck. But if it is that the subjective has
eternal implications, while the objective is (merely) temporal, then there is no balance to
be struck. I am grateful to Ron Beadle for this point.
9. As an aside, but also too important to pass over, Sison and Fontrodona’s (2012, p. 229,
emphasis added) contention that ‘institutions are necessarily corrupt and corrupting of
practices’ is an overstatement. MacIntyre’s point is that the necessary focus on external
goods of institutions (they are goods) always makes the practice ‘vulnerable to the
acquisitiveness of the institution’ and that virtues are required to ‘resist the corrupting
power of institutions’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 194). This points to a fundamental tension in
organizations that we all know and experience on an almost daily basis – the tension
between the relative prioritization of the practice and the institution, and the associated
tension between the pursuit of internal versus external goods. But it does not mean that
practices are necessarily corrupted by institutions, only that they are potentially so. The
virtuous organization remains a possibility, as I have already argued.
10. MacIntyre does not qualify ‘perfection’ but it might more naturally be taken as referring to
the development of the moral character, or the flourishing, of practitioners.
11. For example, Apple, together with Samsung, was the subject of a Friends of the Earth
report on tin mining on the Indonesian island of Banka, where exploitation of the
indigenous people and their environment was alleged – see Friends of the Earth (2012).
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